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bids were be compared across alternative rules for determining job assignments.  
Also, this research report investigated and analyzed the success of the Assignment 
Incentive Pay (AIP) auction format.  In addition, this research addressed and 
reviewed the Navy’s current policy, guidance, and doctrine for billet assignment.  
Furthermore, the report’s recommendations include how the U.S. Navy can 
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This thesis will evaluate the Navy’s current enlisted assignment incentive pay 
program and its effect on retention in the Navy’s enlisted ranks.  The objective of the 
analysis is to compare the current incentive program with alternate and possibly 
improved ways of conducting incentive programs.   These analysis data could improve 
the cost effectiveness of the incentive program.   
 The analysis will focus on experiments designed to evaluate the efficiency of 
alternative auction formats when auctions are used to determine individual assignments 
for one of several available jobs.  In these assignment auctions, bids consisted of 
compensation requests and the subjects were presented with multiple jobs over which to 
bid.  The structure of their bids will be compared across alternative rules for determining 
job assignments. 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze data from previously conducted auction 
experiments to determine if changes in the assignment incentive pay format could 
improve retention and cost effectiveness.  The analysis will explore several auction 
design questions:  how small a weight can be placed on the bid before the efficiency of 
the auction begins to degrade; does the type of auction chosen (i.e., first or second price 
sealed bid) impact the point at which a declining weight on the bid degrades efficiency of 
the auction; does the contention level impact auction efficiency; are there interaction 
effects between auction types and contention levels or bid weights?  The analysis will 
empirically address these questions, using theoretical modeling, simulation modeling and 
advanced econometric analysis as appropriate and supported by the data and 
experimental design.   
B. BACKGROUND  
The Navy became an all volunteer force in 1973.  After sailors finish their initial 
enlistment tour they must negotiate with detailers for their follow-on orders.  The current 
job assignment system relies on a centralized, fairly static pay structure in which Sailors 
are largely paid according to their current rank, but little adjustment is made for hard-to-
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fill locations or jobs. 1 Sometimes these orders are not desired by the Sailor or sometimes 
jobs went unfilled because the billet was unpopular.  Added to the difficulty of the 
current assignment process is a robust and thriving private sector.  The technical training 
received and experience gained by Sailors makes them highly marketable professionals 
for the private sector.  This dichotomous correlation continues to present the Navy with 
retention problems, especially for those Sailors that have in-depth technical training and 
have completed their minimum service requirement.   
 To combat this problem, the Navy, with Congressional authorization, started the 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP).  AIP would be paid as a monthly stipend to attract 
Sailors to volunteer for hard-to-fill assignments.  Although current incentives allow some 
flexibility for location-specific reenlistment bonuses, the fact that some jobs are often 
filled with involuntary assignments suggests that the current set of incentives lack the 
flexibility required to induce voluntary assignments to undesirable billets. An auction was 
determined to be the best method for distributing the AIP stipends to determine the least 
amount of money to pay to assign a qualified sailor to those hard-to-fill jobs.   
Navy enlistment and assignment quotas are driven by policy directives from the 
Chief of Naval Personnel in Millington, Tennessee.  In determining the correct number of 
assignments, several factors have to be taken into consideration.  For example, each sailor 
can only be assigned one billet even though the sailor may have placed bids on several 
assignments.  The bid placed on the winning assignment not only affects that assignment 
but it affects the assignment of the other billets.  Another issue in the assignment process 
is that the sailor’s bid is only one of several factors that will weigh in on the final 
selection.  Other factors could include the Sailor’s dependents and if he meets the 
minimum qualifications for the billet.  Analyzing the auction’s behavior and refining the 
metrics will allow the military chain of command to make more informed decisions in an 
increasingly cost conscious environment.  As stated by the Admiral in charge of 
                                                 
1 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) 
System,” June 2004. 
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personnel distribution at the Navy’s Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS), “Our mission is to 
take care of all Navy Officer and Enlisted personnel and their families, while meeting the 
personnel distribution needs of our Navy. We must assign all personnel in accordance 
with Navy directives and policies to meet both the needs of the Navy while striving to 
satisfy the professional and personal goals of the individual in a most responsive, 
courteous and service orientated manner”2.  With a thorough understanding of the auction 
format and metrics, forecasting can be developed to assist in improving the cost-
effectiveness of the program and improving retention. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How small a weight can be placed on the bid before the efficiency of the 
auction begins to degrade? 
2. Does the type of auction chosen (i.e. first or second price sealed bid) 
impact the point at which a declining weight on the bid degrades efficiency of the 
auction? 
3. Does the contention level impact auction efficiency; are there interaction 
effects between auction types and contention levels or bid weights?   
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis includes:  (1) evaluating the Assignment Incentive Pay 
(AIP) program, (2) analyzing data from previously conducted auction experiments and 
(3) recommending improvements to the auction based metrics system in assignment 
planning.  Other variables that could possibly affect assignments will not be considered 
within the scope of this study: economic conditions in the private sector, operational 
tempo, quality of the tour, quality of life, etc. 
Getting the right Sailor in the right job remains a high priority within the Navy’s 
chain of command.  This is especially true with Sailors that have highly involved 
technical and computer training costs, such as Aegis Fire Control man, all nuclear ratings 
and Aviation electronics.  The introduction of new programs, such as perform to serve, 
which is a mechanism that acts as a force shaping tool by leveling rating manning from 
overmanned to undermanned ratings and provides quality screening by controlling 
                                                 
2 PERS 4 mission statement, Admirals Corner, Bureau of Navy Personnel Command website 
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reenlistments for all first term sailors, demonstrates this commitment.  Previous trends 
and data analysis show that the largest numbers of sailors elect to leave active duty at the 
end of their first enlistment.  Normally, financial incentives, such as Selective Re-
enlistment Bonuses (SRB), are used to entice sailors to remain beyond their initial 
enlistment. 
The Navy receives significant benefits from sailors who remain in the service past 
their initial enlisted commitment.  These benefits include decreases in future training 
costs, increased levels of knowledge beyond the initial enlistment and improved 
selectivity chances for senior rank with a larger pool from which to select. 
A cost analysis was not be performed in this study because the cost of past 
assignments are considered sunk costs at the end of their enlistment, regardless of 
whether Sailors decide to leave or remain on active duty.  These costs include Boot 
Camp, “A” and “C” schools and any other additional training required for their rating.  If 
Sailors decide to remain on active duty beyond their initial enlistment, that provides the 
Navy an opportunity cost of a salary deferred by their electing to do another tour.   If not, 
a new cost would be incurred to train new sailors and the loss of experience of that sailor.  
This thesis pushes forward with the belief that if improvements are made in AIP, the 
results could significantly improve cost savings for the Navy. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides an overview of the auction format and the Assignment 
Incentive Pay Program researched in this study.  The assignment requirements and 
process are also discussed.  Chapter III discusses the experiments and metrics that were 
used in the research.  Chapter IV reviews the analysis and findings.  Chapter V contains 
the conclusions and recommendations. 
F. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate auction bids in the current Navy’s 
Assignment Incentive Pay program for enlisted sailors.  Auction data used from 
previously conducted experiments are analyzed.  The structures of their bids were 
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compared across alternative rules for determining job assignments.  The scope of this 
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II. AUCTION THEORY 
Auction theory centers on a market mechanism in which an object, service, or set 
of objects, is exchanged on the basis of bids submitted by participants. Auctions normally 
provide a specific set of rules that govern the procedure for the sale or purchase of an 
object to the participant with the most favorable bid. In his article “Vickrey Auctions in 
Practice: From Nineteenth Century Philately to Twenty-first Century E-commerce,”  
David Lucking-Reiley states, “In his seminal work on auction theory, William Vickery 
(1961) pointed out three types of auctions used in practice: the English ascending-bid 
auction, the (first-price) sealed-bid auction, and the Dutch declining- price auction”.3  
The English ascending-bid auction process occurs when an auctioneer directs 
participants to beat the current, standing bid.  New bids increase the current bid by a 
predefined increment.  The auction ends when no participant is willing to outbid the 
current standing bid. Then, the participant who placed the current bid is the winner and 
pays the amount bid.  Therefore, the winner ends up paying a price that is equal to the 
second highest bidder’s value.  In a first price sealed bid auction, the bidder who submits 
the highest bid is awarded the object being sold and pays a price equal to the amount bid.  
Finally the Dutch declining – price auction starts with a clock that initially indicates a 
price for the object for sale substantially higher than any bidder is likely to pay. Then, the 
clock gradually decreases the price until a bidder buzzes in or indicates his or her 
willingness to pay. The auction is then concluded and the winning bidder pays the 
amount reflected on the clock at the time he or she stopped the process by buzzing in. 
The Second Price Auction is an auction in which the bidder who submitted the 
highest bid wins the object being sold and pays a price equal to the second highest 
amount bid. Alternately, in a procurement auction, the winner is the bidder who submits 
the lowest bid, and is paid an amount equal to the next lowest submitted bid.  Normally, 
second-price auctions are sealed-bid, in which bidders submit bids simultaneously; their 
results are equivalent to English auctions, in which bidders continue to raise each other's 
                                                 
3 Lucking-Reiley, David Vickery Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth Century Philately to Twenty-
first Century E-commerce. Journal of Economic Perspectives, revised April 2000 
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bids until only one bidder remains. In Second Price Auctions, the strategy is to bid one's 
true value, the highest valued bidder is expected to win the auction and pay a price equal 
to the second highest value.  Alternately, first price auctions award the object to the 
highest bidder, but the payment is equal to the amount bid. 
A. WHY THE NAVY CHOSE FIRST-PRICE AUCTION 
Despite the attractive properties of Vickery auctions (second-price auctions) are 
rarely seen in the business world because of susceptibility.  Vickery auctions are scarce in 
the business world because of the bidder’s fear of truthful revelation of information to the 
third party or the fear of auctioneer cheating.  In the course of our research, we have 
found that bidders (those who have participated in Vickery type auctions) fear that once 
they have submitted their maximum willingness to pay, the auctioneer has an incentive to 
cheat, inflate the second-highest bid or simply withdraw the item from the auction if a 
high bid signals that the good may be more valuable than originally thought.  Therefore, 
this system is totally dependent on the auctioneer’s honesty.  This information proves 
useful because if bidders fear that their sealed bids could be used against them, they will 
actually bid more conservatively.  Therefore, Vickery auction bids are normally lower 
than those of first-price auction bids. 
In first-price and Dutch auctions, bidders tend to behave in the same way.  So, it 
doesn’t matter which of these auctions a seller chooses nor does it matter whether the 
bidders have private values or share common values. The reason that a bidder behaves 
the same in both kinds of auctions is that they make the same decision and this decision is 
based upon the same information. In both auctions, a bidder knows that if they win they 
must pay exactly what they bid. They also know that they only win if their bid is higher 
than that of everyone else. The bidder must also decide upon their bid without knowing 
what others will do.  The overall strategy for first-price auctions is difficult to specify 
because maximizing bid(s) depends on the actions of others.  The tradeoff for the bidder 
is between bidding high and winning or bidding lower and receiving a higher profit if 
they win the auction.  Theory of first-price auctions suggests that most bidders will shade 
their bids to move closer to the market consensus.  This strategy will avoid what is know 
as the “winner’s curse.” 
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So, in order to assess the true impact of the auction parameters on the bidding 
behavior of the subjects the Bid/Reservation Wage ratio for all the winning bids is 
calculated.  The first price (low contention) auction is the most likely auction format to be 
implemented in the Navy.  The recently implemented Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) 
program is an example of a first-price auction.  “AIP attempts to enhance combat 
readiness by permitting market forces to efficiently distribute Sailors where they are most 
needed.”4  The AIP program, eligibility requirements and process are discussed in the 
next section. 
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III. ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
Readiness to meet any threat to the nation’s security is the primary mission of the 
United States Armed Forces during peacetime.  Meeting the nation’s security needs 
requires an assured cadre of experienced professionals who can fill essential and non-
essential positions (billets) throughout the services.  The Navy has recognized that trained 
and ready forces provide the flexibility necessary to shape the global environment and 
deter potential foes.  
In 1973, the United States Navy moved from being a conscription force to being 
an all-volunteer force.  Since 1973, sailors have entered the Navy as volunteers and have 
negotiated their orders through detailers (assignment coordinators).  Unfortunately, the 
negotiation process doesn’t always reflect the desires of the Sailor (service member).  
The Navy has recognized that Sailors do not view all assignments as equally desirable.  
Sailors base their selection on several factors (e.g. geographic location, type of job or 
nature of duty), which play a critical role when negotiating with their detailer (assignment 
coordinator).  It is these factors that make certain assignments in the Navy less desirable 
and difficult to fill. 
The Navy’s current distribution process attempts to fill these assignments 
regardless of desirability, but, because of the natural dynamics of the system, less 
desirable assignments are more difficult to provide sufficient manning.  The Navy has 
implemented several different incentive programs to help fill less desirable assignments. 
For example, sailors are often offered guaranteed follow on orders (silver bullet) to their 
next assignment.  This method ensures that if the Sailor agrees to accept a hard-fill 
assignment the sailor is guaranteed orders of his or her choosing after completing the 
assignment.  Other incentives include promotion opportunities and monetary incentives 
(e.g. Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), Location Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
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(LSRB), and or Hazardous Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L)).5  Regrettably, these incentives 
often to do not overcome the desirability issue(s) and often oppose the established sea 
and shore rotations. 
In June of 2003, the Navy began offering Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) to 
alleviate shortages in hard-fill assignments.  AIP was initiated to “balance the playing 
field” and “attempt to make all assignments desirable to at least one qualified 
volunteer.”6  The implementation of AIP would still result in some undesirable 
assignments but overall it would make all assignments more desirable to at least one 
qualified volunteer.  Also, since AIP is designed to increase volunteerism for hard-fill 
assignments and locations it should ultimately increase the sailors’ satisfaction and 
improve retention for all sailors who meet the Navy’s AIP eligibility requirements. 
B. ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY (AIP) PROGRAM  
AIP is a special pay authorized by Congress for USN/USNR enlisted active duty 
personnel (service members) serving in assignments designated by the respective Service 
Secretary.  In the Navy, responsibility and policy management is assigned to OPNAV 
N13 (Director Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division).  The AIP program is 
managed by a Distribution Incentives Board (DIB) which is comprised of representatives 
from the Fleet.  Naval Personnel Command (COMNAVPERSCOM) and the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) are designated to establish and provide guidance on 
AIP practices and procedures.  They are also required to monitor the program and 
provide recommendations for maximum amounts and budgeting to N13.  The 
Distribution Incentive Management System (DIMS) was developed to provide the 
managers (DIB, N130, and PERS 40) with a tool to aid them in efficiently administering 
the AIP program.  DIMS is designed to track all AIP bidding activity and payments, 
                                                 
5 Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP): available to service members who are assigned to billets 
authorized for SDAP, must meet eligibility requirements. SDAP is subject to Federal Withholding Tax but 
not FICA tax.  Location Service Reenlistment Bonus (LSRB): an extension of the current Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB); available to service members who meet SRB requirements, subject to Federal 
Withholding Tax but not FICA tax.  Hazardous Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L): available to service members 
who meet the specific requirements prescribed in DoD 7000. 14-R, Volume 7A, Section 2401; not subject 
to Federal Withholding Tax or FICA Tax. 
6 Jones, Michael, personal interview, 14 January 2005. 
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provide recommendations for maximum level changes, and provide budgeting forecasts.  
DIMS is designed to use activity manning trends along with bid activity to determine 
effective AIP levels. 
The Navy designates AIP- eligible assignments (jobs) and sets a maximum 
monetary incentive for each job, which, by law, must not exceed $1,500 a month.  
Originally, during the early stages of the AIP program, the Navy based the maximum 
monetary incentives on an assignment’s location and pay-grade.  Since then, the Navy 
has included and offered higher incentives for certain types of assignments, particularly 
hard fill positions located overseas.  Not all personnel assigned to an AIP location are 
eligible to receive AIP monthly payments.  “Only personnel who have negotiated AIP 
assignments and are ordered to AIP locations after the implementation of the AIP 
program were entitled to receive monetary incentives.”7  
C. ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY (AIP) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
AIP is designed to attract volunteers for assignments that have been traditionally 
difficult to fill.  AIP can be used in place of or in conjunction with other monetary 
incentives to fill assignments designated as AIP hard-fill.  Service members who wish to 
compete for AIP must be either U.S. Navy or U.S. Naval Reserve active- duty personnel.  
Also, the service member must be in a sea/shore rotation rating, qualified for the job 
requested, eligible for assignment in a “for duty” status and must apply for the 
assignment via Job Advertising and Selection System (JASS)[see Appendix C. for JASS 
displays].  Additionally, service members on their initial tours are not eligible for AIP but 
they may compete after completing their initial tour.  Furthermore, personnel who are 
designated “Fit for Duty” but unsuitable for “Operational Duty” will not be allowed or 
entitled to compete for the monetary incentives AIP offers.  Moreover, this program is 
not available to SELRES, FTS, TAR, IRR and ADSW∗ personnel.  In addition, personnel 
                                                 
7  
* SELRES stands for Selected Reserve. 
FTS stands for Full Time Support 
TAR stands for Temporary Active Duty Reserve. 
IRR stands for Individual Ready Reserve. 
ADSW stands for Active Duty for Special Work. 
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who have been granted high year tenure (HYT) are not eligible for AIP.  AIP is for those 
personnel who have been ordered to an authorized AIP location and are eligible to 
receive the entitlement.   
For those who are selected for the AIP assignment, the entitlement begins when 
the member reports to the activity for which the incentive was awarded.  The entitlement 
continues until the member permanently detaches from the activity and is prorated for 
partial months. 
D. ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY (AIP) PROCESS 
Traditionally, enlisted detailers are responsible for meeting the assignment request 
from sailors and efficiently manning the world’s greatest Navy.  Today’s Navy demands 
the highest quality and best trained sailors to maintain naval readiness.  Detailers review 
each individual’s rotation window for enlisted personnel.  This enables detailers to 
provide well-prepared sailors in proper numbers, on time (rotation) and in the most cost-
effective ways possible.  By effectively monitoring rotation windows, detailers are able to 
meet the Fleet’s dynamic manning requirements, provide contact reliefs for each gaining 
and losing command, and provide greater career opportunities for each sailor.  Normally, 
enlisted service members are required to submit a NAVPERS 1306/63∗ form (Enlisted 
Duty Preference Form) upon completing six months of their current duty station.  
Detailers use this information to match all personnel assets to Navy-wide manning 
requirements and try to fulfill the service member’s assignment desires.  If the service 
member does not submit a duty preference form or regularly update it, they can be 
assigned to a Navy top-priority billet by their detailer.  This assignment process does not 
consider the service member’s (non-volunteer) duty preferences and precludes any 
assignment negotiations between the detailer and the proposed service member.  If 
detailers were continuously use this method of detailing it would have a negative affect 
on service member’s re-enlistments and the utility of the Navy’s human resources. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
∗ The enlisted service member must complete and submit NAVPERS 1306/63 in accordance with the 
Enlisted Transfer Manual (NAVPERS 15909G). 
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As it struggles to do more with less and meet the needs of its personnel, the Navy 
has undertaken an innovative approach to manning its ships with fewer hands on deck.  
Inspired by large commercial corporations which have attempted to improve their profit 
and productivity, the Navy has implemented its AIP system to better match qualified 
personnel to assignments, especially for assignments that have been historically difficult 
to fill (Navy top-priority billets).  AIP is based on the principle of “supply and demand.”8  
A good example of this concept is that not every service member views each assignment 
equally.  For example, location seems to be a determining factor in whether or not a 
service member accepts orders to a specific assignment.  Sailor (A) may see a duty 
location as undesirable, sailor (B) views the duty location as desirable and sailor (C) may 
be indifferent about the location of the billet.  The AIP system is designed to capture 
these differences and increase the probability of finding a volunteer to fill a hard-fill 
assignment. 
Applying for an AIP assignment is relatively easy.  First, the sailor must use JASS 
when he or she is about nine months out from their scheduled permanent change of 
station (PCS).  [Appendix A]  Second, the sailor must review current and hot jobs 
available that have been designated as an AIP location.  Third, if the sailor is interested in 
bidding for a particular billet he or she will bid in $50 increments for the position of 
choice.  The range for bidding can be as low as $0 but may not exceed $1,500, which is 
the maximum congress has allowed for this monetary incentive program.  Fourth, the 
sailor selects from the scroll down menu what he or she is willing to accept.  All AIP 
incentive pay amounts will vary by location and position.  Lastly, once all bids are in 
from all qualified personnel the detailer will make the final selection based on the range 
of qualified bids, PCS cost and any additional factors pertaining to each position.  
Generally, the qualified sailor with the lowest bid (total cost) is selected.  Once the sailor 
is selected for an AIP assignment, he or she is issued PCS orders that include the AIP to 
which the sailor is entitled for that particular assignment.  Upon receipt of these orders, 
the sailor signs an agreement and acknowledges the assignment location, duration and 
AIP amount to be accepted on a monthly basis.  Although this type of electronic bidding 
                                                 
8 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) System,” June 2004 
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is only used for AIP authorized positions, it may one day become the Navy’s normal day-
to-day detailing process for posting and assigning sea and shore based positions. 
E. ANALYSIS REVIEW  
In June 2004, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) evaluated the Navy’s AIP 
system.  They examined many aspects of the AIP system, but this section of the paper 
will focus on JASS participation between various pay grades, fill rates, and effects of 
raising the cap per assignment.  In addition, CNA recognized that when converting billets 
from Type 3 (sea duty) to Type 6 (overseas shore duty), AIP was very cost effective.9 
All sailors have the choice of negotiating their next assignment with their detailer, 
but if they choose to apply for an AIP assignment they must use the Job Advertising and 
Selection System (JASS)10.  JASS is a software application that is available on the Naval 
Personnel Command’s website for enlisted sailors to review and apply for available 
billets.  Therefore, it is important to understand who has access to JASS, who uses JASS 
and examine whether the implementation of AIP has increased JASS usage.  
Accessibility to the JASS system is open to all sailors who desire to electronically detail 
their next assignment.  Once on JASS, the sailor can view all billets posted on JASS or 
choose the AIP option if he or she is interested in an AIP assignment.  A factor to 
consider when assessing JASS usage is the fact that some sailors are stationed overseas 
and subject to time zone differences.  These time zone differences have no affect on the 
accessibility to JASS but do affect the accessibility to detailers.  For example, if the sailor 
has a specific question about an AIP assignment he or she may be unable to contact their 
detailer.  CNA stated that “the difficulty of sailors stationed overseas is not accessing 
JASS but in accessing a detailer on the phone.”11 Therefore, the only possible restriction 
                                                 
9 For reference, Type 1 jobs are continental United States (CONUS) shore duty; Type 2 are CONUS 
sea duty; Type 3 are outside CONUS (OCONUS) shore jobs that are given sea duty credit; Type 4 are 
OCONUS sea duty; and Type 6 are OCONUS shore duty. 
10 JASS has been replaced by JCMS (JASS Career Management System).  JCMS is designed to enable 
Sailors and Commands to identify the best job for the Sailor and best Sailor for the command. JCMS is 
designed to provide a bridge between existing legacy distribution systems and the Career Management 
System functionality of Sea Warrior. 
11 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) System,” June 2004. 
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in accessibility to JASS would be a technical limitation that prevents sailors from 
uploading the JASS web site. 
CNA also discovered variations in JASS usage between pay grades.  Their 
findings indicated that junior sailors have a tendency to use JASS more often than senior 
sailors.  This variance is due to senior sailors feeling more comfortable speaking to their 
detailer when searching and negotiating for career enhancing orders vice accepting an 
AIP assignment that may not be career enhancing.  Since detailers have direct control of 
the distribution process, senior sailors see that it is imperative for them to speak directly 
to their detailer when shaping their careers and family needs. 
Unfortunately, CNA was hampered in measuring JASS usage because of data 
limitations.  Data limitations reflect the recent implementation of the AIP system.  Since 
AIP was implemented in March 2004 and the CNA analysis was conducted and reported 
in June 2004, insufficient time had elapsed for CNA to collect enough numerical data to 
accurately assess JASS usage.  Due to the data limitations, CNA was only able to analyze 
those sailors that had at least submitted one application on JASS.  Therefore, insufficient 
data “limits our analysis because it means that we cannot identify the absolute level of 
JASS usage, and we can only evaluate relative differences in application rates across 
various Sailor characteristics or over time.”12  Moreover, CNA was unable to extrapolate 
their findings to determine whether AIP assignments were undesirable or if differences 
existed between pay grades, ratings or duty type (sea/shore codes).  The analysis did 
reveal that implementation of AIP effectively increased usage rates among the various 
pay grades and ratings but it was also evident (as mentioned above) that certain groups of 
Sailors preferred to be directly detailed vice applying on JASS.  Understanding who has 
access to JASS, who uses JASS and if the implementation of AIP had increased JASS 
usage could assist detailers in meeting manning requirements. 
The readiness of this nation is solely based on the effectiveness of meeting 
manning requirements.  Therefore, people and personnel are the single most important 
factors of military readiness and placing them in the right positions is imperative to the 
                                                 
12 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) System,” June 2004. 
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success of this nation’s security.  Therefore, by allowing sailors to set their prices, 
through a bidding process for an assignment selected as a hard-fill job or location will 
increase fill rate percentages for those assignments considered undesirable.  There are 
many factors that affect the Navy’s ability to increase fill rates for all commands.  For 
example, every pay grade and rating views locations or jobs differently.  Also, decreasing 
or increasing CAP∗ levels for specific locations or jobs would have an overall affect on 
fill rates.  Furthermore, increasing fill rates can be complicated by other trade-offs or 
factors, such as PCS funding availability, job availability for various pay grades or 
ratings and eligibility requirements.  AIP is a fairly new program and because of its 
implementation there is a strong indication that fill rates have increased and will continue 
to increase for locations and jobs authorized as AIP assignments.  Unfortunately, since 
AIP had only been in existence for 10 months when CNA conducted their analysis, it was 
difficult to determine whether or not AIP had contributed to the increased fill rates.  As 
more time elapses, AIP becomes more popular and participation increases, there will be 
more complete data available to truly assess whether manning in AIP locations has 
increased because of AIP implementation. 
Earlier in this section we mentioned that raising the cap affects the ability to 
increase fill rate percentages.  Raising the cap increases the probability of increasing fill 
rates because it induces an increase in application rate.  For instance, CNA discovered 
that when a cap was raised by $300 dollars there was a 52% increase in applications and 
a 115% increase in fill rates.  This is extremely important to the Navy because it 
“suggest[s] that the Navy could consider a cap increase when more applications or a 
higher fill rate is required.”13 This information can be used strategically to increase 
manning levels for commands that are historically difficult to fill.  The CNA’s analysis 
suggests that increasing the cap ultimately increases the application pool of those 
interested and qualified for that particular assignment.  “Raising the AIP cap allows each 
sailor to find a job that best matches his or her preferences, until there is an optimal 
                                                 
∗ For our purposes we define CAP as the maximum amount of monetary incentive the Navy is willing 
to pay for a specific billet in a designated location. 
13 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) System,” June 2004, pg 
20. 
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match of jobs and sailors, and no one is assigned involuntarily.”14  In spite of this, the 
Navy must be careful when raising the cap that it doesn’t create gapped billets. This can 
occur if there are more jobs than available sailors.  By raising the cap it could create gaps 
in other locations which would ultimately lead to involuntary assignments.  Also, the 
Navy must scrutinize all raised caps per location and job to ensure that it does not exceed 
the cost-effectiveness of AIP. 
The overall cost effectiveness of AIP has been impressive.  CNA rationalized that 
the AIP program was not only developed to increase volunteerism but to begin 
eliminating Type 3 duty (sea duty) and replacing it with Type 6 duty (shore duty).  
Remember that sailors were offered shore duty billets with sea duty credit (authorized sea 
pay) as an incentive to accept hard-fill assignments.  AIP allows the Navy the opportunity 
to convert 8,800 Type 3 billets into Type 6 billets.  This conversion enables the Navy to 
outsource the Type 6 billets and save an estimated $195 million dollars annually.  Also,  
converting 8,800 positions into Type 6 billets increases the sailors available for actual sea 
duty billets.  Finally, the AIP program is a much more efficient incentive than sea duty 
credit for overseas assignments.  Analysis conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) revealed, “Using an efficient market system in which AIP is targeted by billet, the 
cost of getting volunteers for OCONUS (Overseas Continental United States) billets 
would probably be below $25 million annually.  The sea duty credit (costing $83 million 
annually at a minimum) is at least three times more costly than AIP.  Even under a worst 
case scenario, assuming all OCONUS shore billets that receive sea duty credit were paid 
AIP of $750 per month, AIP should be cost-effective.”15 As stated in an earlier section, 
the average AIP bid (generally about $350 a month) has been much less than $750 per 
month; accordingly CNA’s analysis understates the relative efficiency of AIP versus sea 
duty credit.   
                                                 
14 Golfin, Peggy, et all. “Evaluation of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) System,”  
June 2004, pg 24. 
15 CNA Report – Transforming the Assignment System: Will Incentives Reduce Critical Shortages? – 
CRM D0007147.A2, December 2002 
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F. SYNOPSIS 
Our analysis concludes that AIP has demonstrated significant benefits for the 
Navy’s personnel distribution system and it should continue to evolve as time elapses.  
AIP has proven that it can be an effective tool to persuade sailors to apply and accept 
hard-fill assignments. Thus, the Navy should continue to monitor and analyze sailor 
application behaviors.  The Navy must focus on variations that may exist between various 
ratings and pay grades and the effects of raising and lowering the monetary incentive.  
These data will prove useful to the detailers in predicting which assignments will be 
difficult to fill and determining what measures must be taken to increase the probability 
of receiving at least one voluntary qualified sailor application.   
AIP allows the Navy the opportunity to convert positions from Type 3 to Type 6 
positions.  This conversion (for OCONUS positions) will enable the Navy to save 
millions of dollars annually.  Furthermore, as a result of the type duty conversion, the 
Navy will have an estimated 8,800 additional sailors available for sea duty assignments.  
Therefore, improving future readiness and providing more at sea training opportunities 
for sailors.  Moreover, the research indicates that the effectiveness of AIP can be 
increased by adjusting cap rates methodically or by offering sailors lump-sum payments 
vice monthly incentives.   
AIP is in its infancy and it is far too early to fully assess the total utility of AIP.  
As time elapses and more data becomes available, we may discover that AIP has an 
overwhelming positive effect on retention and manning.  Currently, data reflect that 
Sailor’s who are aware of or have directly participated in this new assignment initiative 
indicate that they are extremely supportive of the AIP program.  “The AIP program is 
giving more Sailors a choice in their duty assignments and promises to increase the 
quality of life and career satisfaction of sailors and their families.”16   
The importance of understanding the many factors (e.g. sailor characteristics, 
performance measurements, and measurements of effectiveness) that contribute to the 
                                                 
16 Kelly, Mike, LCDR (N13). “Draft AIP Report to Congress.” E-mail to Michael.T.Jones@navy.mil. 
01 April 2005. 
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limitations and the success of AIP is that it will assist us in analyzing data from 
previously conducted auction experiments.  The next section will explore several auction 
design questions and address issues and concerns surrounding the performance 
measurements for evaluating alternative auction formats employed in experimental 
















IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
A. GENERAL 
This study will analyze experiments to evaluate the efficiency of alternative 
auction formats when auctions are used to determine individual assignments for one of 
several available billets (jobs).  In these assignment auctions, bids consist of 
compensation requests and the participants are presented with numerous billet 
opportunities on which to bid.  The structure of their bids will be compared across 
alternative rules for determining billet assignment.  
B. INTENTIONS 
This effort will analyze data from previously conducted auction experiments.  The 
analysis will explore several auction design questions:  how small a weight can be placed 
on the bid before the efficiency of the auction begins to degrade; does the type of auction 
chosen (i.e. first or second price sealed bid) impact the point at which a declining weight 
on the bid degrades efficiency of the auction; does the contention level impact auction 
efficiency; are there interaction effects between auction types and contention levels or bid 
weights?  The analysis will empirically address these questions, using theoretical 
modeling, simulation modeling and advanced econometric analysis as appropriate and 
supported by the data and experimental design.  The final report will develop a 
theoretical model of bidding behavior with testable hypotheses, and provide preliminary 
results on these hypotheses. 
C. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION 
Instructions for the experimental auction are found in an appendix but are 
discussed here.  Each participate (sailor) in the experiment made decisions in this 
experimental auction.  There were 5 other participants (6 total) which were gathered as 
candidates to fill 5 fictitious jobs (billets) for low contention cases and 3 fictitious jobs 
for high contention cases.  The decision to only use 6 participants in this study is because 
on average there is only a small group of “actual sailors” that compete for online billets.  
Whether or not they were selected for a particular billet in part depended on how 
qualified they were for the billet (as expressed by a fitness score randomly generated by 
the software) and how willing they were to take the job (as expressed by how low their 
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bid is for the billet).  The greater the bid for a job, the more money the participant  
received if selected.  On other hand, bidding high for a job made it less likely that they 
were selected for that job.  Bidding high on all jobs made it more likely that the 
participant was unassigned.  If not assigned to a billet, the participant did not earn any 
money in that auction and incurred a penalty of $0.30. 
Each participant’s “bids and profits in these auctions will be in terms of 
Gamebucks, converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of U.S. dollars/Gamebucks = 0.10.  In 
other words, if the participant were to earn 10 Gamebucks in profit he or she would earn 
$1.00 in U.S. dollars.”  Each participant is guaranteed $13 for participating in the 
experimental auction, but has the opportunity to earn more. 
1. C.1 Data 
The data for evaluation were derived from an experiment conducted at several 
universities (University of Memphis, Southern Methodist University (SMU) and The 
University of Mississippi).  The purpose of the experimental auction is to match Sailors 
to billets and “evaluate the comparative ability of alternative auction mechanisms to 
achieve effective labor assignment.”17  The experiment lasted 60-90 minutes in duration 
and involved six participants (sailors) competing in a series of 20 auctions.  Each auction 
was run in succession but independent of one another.  Each sailor competed for either 
three of six billets in which they would be assigned to one of those billets based off of 
their maximum bid (reservation wage) and fitness score.  Therefore, the winning bidders 
would be assigned to a billet and paid accordingly (their lowest acceptable bid).  For each 
losing bidder, he or she will not be assigned to a billet and will not receive any payment.  
In each auction there will be either three or six winning bidders and three or one losing 
bidders.  The following section introduces and explains the metrics to be used to measure 
auction effectiveness. 
                                                 
17 Smith, James, L. “The Design of Experiments to measure and assess the efficiency of Alternative 
Assignment Auction Formats” September 2003, pg 1.  
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D. MEASURES OF AUCTION PERFORMANCE 
This section proposes performance measures for evaluating the alternative auction 
formats employed in experimental analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Assignment Incentive Pay 
auctions.  In particular, we expand on “measures of auction effectiveness” put forward in 
“The Design of Experiments to Measure and Assess the Efficiency of Alternative 
Assignment Auction Formats” by James L. Smith (September 8, 2003).”  
The discussion is separated into the following sections: 
• Relevant notation 
• Understanding the “efficient outcome” 
• Normalization/indexing of performance measures 
• Analysis of specific performance measures 
E. RELEVANT NOTATION 
• cijk = reservation wage of sailor i for billet j as assigned 
(randomly ex ante) for auction k 
• fijk = fitness score of sailor i for billet j as assigned (randomly ex 
ante) for auction k 
• bijk =  bid by sailor i for billet j during auction k 
• smin = minimum allowed bid 
• smax = maximum allowed bid 
• sijk = salary/wage paid to sailor i for billet j as a result of auction 
k 
• zijk = aggregate score of sailor i for billet j during auction k 
o = 100α(1- bijk/smax)+(1-α)fijk 
• xijk = billet assignment identification function 
o = 1 if sailor i is assigned billet j during auction k 
o = 0 otherwise 
 26
F. UNDERSTANDING THE “EFFICIENT OUTCOME” 
1. Background 
a. The definition and nature of the “efficient outcome” is critically important 
in this discussion because almost all of the performance measures analyzed below use 
some measurement of performance at this outcome as a denominator or, more generally, 
as a way to index or scale the performance measures. 
b.  The “efficient outcome” of the auction could be defined as the assignment 
and associated pay levels that would occur if all subject/sailor bids were replaced by true 
reservation wages, such that the “efficient score” of sailor i for billet j during auction k is 
given by 100α(1- cijk/smax)+(1-α)fijk.  However, it is not clear in what sense the above 
described outcome is “efficient.”  The efficient outcome is traditionally defined as the 
outcome which maximizes total surplus.  In this case, total surplus would be the sum of 
the surpluses enjoyed by each sailor (actual wage minus reservation wage for assigned 
billet) plus the surplus or utility of the Navy.  It is not clear, however, that the above 
defined “efficient outcome” actually incorporates either sailor or Navy surplus/utility.  
There is certainly something appealing about the billet assignment that results from 
sailors bidding their true reservation wages (in the sense that it maximizes some type of 
“true” score), but we should be careful about calling this outcome “efficient.”  Labeling 
the defined outcome as the “focal outcome” or “index outcome” or “baseline outcome” 
might be more appropriate. 
c. Obviously, an efficient outcome can only be defined if every party’s utility 
function (or surplus) is well-defined.  Sailor utility is clear: actual wage minus reservation 
wage for assigned billet.  Navy utility, however, is unclear.  The Navy cares about both 
fitness scores and wages paid.  At first, it may seem reasonable to define Navy utility 
from auction k as Zk which is the sum of the realized scores across sailors given by:  




k ijk ijk ijk
i j
Z b s f xα α
= =
= − + −∑∑  
This definition of Navy utility, however, is problematic for three main reasons: 
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Under the second price auction, sailor salaries are not equal to their bids, so 
perhaps the bijk values in the formula above should be replaced by sijk values, because 
presumably the Navy’s utility function must incorporate actual salaries paid.  This being 
the case, of course, begs the question of why aggregate scores are the same under the first 
and second price auction. 
If Navy utility is defined as Zk or some slight modification thereof, then the 
question of which value of α is optimal from the Navy’s perspective (one of the main 
proposed research questions) is a non-sequitur.  The optimal value of α should be exactly 
the true value of α in the Navy’s utility function.  Whereas it can be argued that the true 
value of α in the Navy’s utility function is unknown, this would make it impossible to 
identify the optimal outcome from the Navy’s perspective as well as impossible to define 
the efficient outcome, returning us to the original problem. 
If Navy utility is defined as Zk (or by Zk with bijk in the formula replaced by sijk) 
and the sailor’s utility is defined as sijk - cijk, then each dollar of salary is worth 100α / 
smax to the Navy while it is worth $1 to the sailor.  Since 100α / smax ≠ 1 in all but knife-
edge cases, total surplus is always increased by either paying all sailors an infinite salary 
(or whatever the upper bound is) or by compelling all sailors to take the lowest possible 
salary, even negative if that is possible.  Obviously, these are unreasonable as “efficient 
outcomes” and, moreover, we would probably like to consider total efficiency 
independent of simple transfers of money.  In other words, we would probably want a 
dollar to have the same value to all, even though this is commonly violated by varying 
wealth effects, risk aversion, opportunity costs, etc.   
That proper definition of the Navy’s utility function is not only important for 
identifying the “true” efficient outcome that maximizes total surplus, but also for 
identification of the optimal auction mechanism from the Navy’s perspective.  It is clear 
ex ante that the performance measures described below will rank the various auctions 
quite differently, with some pairs of measures likely selecting diametrically opposed 
rankings.  Thus, an overall Navy utility function would also allow for better weighing of 
alternative mechanisms. 
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We propose, therefore, that Navy utility from auction k be defined as *kZ  where: 




k ijk ijk ijk
i j
Z s s f xα α
= =
= − + −∑∑ . 
In other words, *kZ = Zk with bijk in the formula replaced by sijk.  To overcome the 
problem identified in point (2)(c) above, we propose that sailor i’s utility from auction k 
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In other words, uik is simply sailor i’s surplus from his actual assignment j  (sijk-
cijk) multiplied by 100α/smax, which scales his utility appropriately  such that both sailors 
and the Navy value a dollar equally, eliminating “corner solution”, efficient outcomes 
involving infinitely positive or negative salaries. 
With utilities so defined, we can now define the true efficient outcome(s) of 
auction k as the outcome(s) which maximizes total surplus TSk given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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This yields exactly the assignment that was originally proposed as part of the 
“efficient outcome,” (partially) rehabilitating the original concept.  However, this 
“efficient outcome” is unique only in its assignment.  After scaling sailor utilities, a dollar 
is now worth the same to the Navy as it is to any sailor.  Therefore, any salary 
arrangement for the above defined assignment will be efficient: Total surplus is 
unaffected by simple transfers of money from the Navy to any sailor or vice versa.  Thus, 
it is appropriate to refer to a unique “efficient assignment” but not a unique “efficient 
outcome” where the notion of outcome includes a set of sailor salaries. 
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G. NORMALIZATION/INDEXING OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
1. Background 
a. All of the performance measures proposed here are normalized or indexed 
by dividing the gross measurement by a “baseline” measurement. 
b. Such normalization is presumably intended to (a) present the value of a 
measure relative to some well-understood “baseline” scenario and (b) facilitate 
comparisons of alternative auction mechanisms within and across different performance 
measures. 
c. Normalization of performance measures facilitates comparisons across 
different measures only when performance values have substantially the same meaning 
across measures.  For example, if a high value is “good” in one measure a high value 
should be “good” in other measures as well whenever the normalizations are intended to 
facilitate cross-measure comparisons.  Moreover, if some normalized measures are 
constrained between zero and one, they should all be simultaneously constrained.  
Without these consistencies it makes comparisons across measures very difficult.  In the 
analysis below, we propose alternative normalizations that provide this consistency. 
H. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Measure name 
Total Wage Bill (WB) 
Quality to be measured 
The Navy’s total monetary cost of filling the available billets 
Discussion 
a. All else equal, a high value of WB is bad from the Navy’s perspective.  
This is important to consider when making comparisons with other performance 
measures where high values are good from the Navy’s perspective. 
b. In this analysis, total wage bill will be normalized by dividing by the total 
wage bill when (a) each sailor is paid his/her reservation wage, and (b) sailors are 
assigned to the available billets such that the lowest sum of reservation wages is 
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achieved.  The index or baseline outcome in this case is the minimum-cost voluntary-
participation outcome.  This has the advantage of being both a feasible outcome and a 
true minimum achievable total wage bill.  However, the total wage bill is likely to be 
significantly higher than the minimum cost voluntary-participation outcome, so this 
normalized measure would be greater than one.  Inverting the measure (flipping the 
numerator and denominator) would add the additional normalizing feature of scaling all 
values between 0 and 1 with higher values being better from the Navy’s perspective. 
c. In sum, we propose the following wage bill performance measure for a 












Where kBW ′  is the minimum-cost voluntary-participation total wage bill described 
above. 
Measure name 
Total Fitness Level (TF) 
Quality to be measured 
Extent to which Sailors are qualified for the billets to which they are assigned by 
the auction mechanism in force. 
Discussion 
a. As with the previous performance measure, it again seems appropriate to 
normalize a total fitness level performance measure by the maximum/minimum feasible 
value.  Because “bigger is better” in this measure, the maximum feasible value seems 
appropriate, and it is very simple in any auction to identify the billet 
allocation/assignment that maximizes the sum of all fitness scores across assigned billets. 
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1 1  
Where kFT ′  is the maximum feasible total fitness as described above. 
Measure name 
Overall Score (OE) 
Quality to be measured 





a. This performance measure evaluates how well the auction “scored” 
relative to the maximum possible total score achievable, which is reached at the 
previously described “efficient outcome.”   
b. In this case, the use of the “efficient outcome” (z*) as a normalization is 
appropriate because this measure is about evaluating how close an auction comes to this 
outcome.  Moreover, the measure appropriately normalizes values between 0 and 1 with 
higher values representing better performance.  It is therefore comparable to all of the 





Bidding Factor (BF) 
Quality to be measured 




a. As opposed to other measures, this performance measure takes on values 
greater than one which is more appropriate in this context; moreover, all realized values 
of this measure are constrained to be no less than one (which is appealing). 
Summary 
The idea here is, of course, to establish a set of measures that enables the project 
team to accurately monitor and effectively analyze the assignment auction experiment.  
Once the metrics are gathered, the numbers can be used to formulate an overall 
conclusion about the overall bidding behavior and the effects of auction design. 
I. EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION RESULTS 
The auction data were derived from various experiments conducted at three 
separate universities at three different geographical areas with different proctors. 
However, the experimental data were consolidated and analyze as a whole. It is important 
to note that each university conducted their respective auction experiments using 
different fitness versus bid weights (F&B) weights than the other universities. As a result, 
the total data collected spanned six different F&B weight categories of F20/B80, 
F34/B66, F50/B50, F66/B34, F80/F20, F90/B10 and their decision variables of Overall 
Efficiency, Fitness, Wage Bill, and Bid Factor All. The Solver add-in function with a 
VBA macro within Microsoft Excel was used to optimize the efficiency assignments of 
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the numerical data derived from the experimental auction. Determining the optimal 
efficiency assignments for each variable and optimal weight within that variable allows 
the research group to determine what the most efficient auction format is for the Navy 
and sailor. For all intents and purposes, contention levels reflect actual supply demand 
balances and thus are not a realistic controllable variable for the Navy. The mean and 
standard deviation were determined to analyze common trends and compare various 
auctions overall efficiency.  
1. Fitness Score 
As the weight assignment is shifted from fitness to bid, the Fit efficiency 
increases across all variables.  In each individual matrix, Fit increases from low to high 
contention and from 1st to 2nd price auction until F66/B34 where no specific pattern is 
recognized. The highest Fit outcome for each matrix is in the 2nd price auction field.  
The 2x2 matrix table, which displays the mean in the top portion of each section 
and the standard deviation in bottom portion, proposes that participants with high fitness 
scores, no matter what contention level or auction format have a high chance of being 
selected regardless of auction format or contention level will have a better opportunity for 
selection.  The Navy’s goal directed by the Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) is to place 
“the right sailor in the right job at the right time” therefore, fitness score is integral in the 
auction process. As illustrated in figure 1.1 below, since the fitness score is relatively 
high across all weights, contentions, and formats; it can be ignored in lieu of the 
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1st High 1st Low 2nd Hi 2nd Low
 
Figure 1.2. Above illustrates the extent to which Sailors are qualified for the billets to 
which they are assigned by the auction mechanism in force. 
 
         
20/80     66/34    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 0.953976997 0.963171919    Low 0.989433098 0.988383161   
  0.02734416 0.028533753      0.013273796 0.015317406   
High 0.944963992 0.959773445    High 0.988148148 0.993404861   
  0.034633707 0.027910498      0.020343898 0.013992291   
Contention      Contention     
         
34/66     80/20    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 0.967363687 0.972861878    Low 0.995208606 0.995526473   
  0.023369486 0.023434986      0.00750111 0.00739069   
High 0.969537233 0.971342005    High 0.993706601 0.998863636   
  0.033728847 0.027125329      0.011140481 0.005016396   
Contention      Contention     
         
50/50     90/10    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 0.973360891 0.978479276    Low 0.999716312 1   
  0.026366621 0.022677754      0.001944867 2.92283E-12   
High 0.980403772 0.984663121    High 0.998611111 1   
  0.02854137 0.018166006      0.005240602 1.8647E-12   
Contention      Contention     
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2. Wage Bill 
The dominant trend seems to be that Wage Bill efficiency increases from 2nd to 1st 
price auctions across all weights except for F66/B34 where 2nd price high contention 
outperformed 1st price high contention. It also important to note that all 2nd price high 
contention auctions have high standard deviations indicating that Wage Bill outcomes 
vary significantly throughout the experiment.  As a result, 1st price high contention across 
any weight seems to be the optimal choice.  
 All else equal, a low efficiency value of WB is bad from the Navy’s standpoint.  
It is an indication of a higher premium the Navy must pay to fill a particular billet. This is 
essential to understand when comparing other performance measures.  Figure 2.1 below, 
indicates that under the 1st price high contention auction WB is lower than other formats. 
This is interesting because traditionally participants should bid their reservation wage in a 
2nd price auction. However, later results show this not to be the case.  
 
Figure 2.1.  Wage Bill 
 
WB         
20/80     66/34    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.67815842 0.650098435    Low 0.574137822 0.488211134   
  0.089770733 0.075335626      0.088510937 0.049021166   
High 0.74624817 0.620424754    High 0.683345996 0.751321127   
  0.089770733 0.099835619      0.067628718 0.114430061   
Contention      Contention     
         
34/66     80/20    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.752624852 0.583577816    Low 0.614811825 0.485031339   
  0.077859958 0.086385579      0.060885109 0.068849186   
High 0.807915132 0.734893491    High 0.592927888 0.509524058   
  0.100659912 0.10375679      0.078101712 0.129811729   
Contention      Contention     
         
50/50     90/10    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.632624501 0.498516235    Low 0.460264164 0.369874755   
  0.064193095 0.095996323      0.056826515 0.063392137   
High 0.695907837 0.613204789    High 0.507702614 0.425885017   
  0.104193919 0.112583691      0.106238159 0.105623748   




















1st High 1st Low 2nd Hi 2nd Low
 
Figure 2.2.  Above illustrates the minimum-cost voluntary-participation total 
wage bill described. 
3. Bid Factor All 
Bid Factor increases across all weights from high to low contention with the 
exception of F20/B80 1st price auction. All weights, contentions, and auction formats 
have high standard deviations making this a hard variable from which to draw a 
conclusion. With the exception of F20/B80, 2nd price high contention seems to exhibit the 
least bid inflation.  Under this performance measure values greater than one are most 
suitable for what it intends to calculate.  Figure 3.1 below, supports the proposed “Bid 
Factor All” definition where the measure of “truthful revelation” is completely accurate.  
In the auction format used, participants are not being asked to reveal their reservation 
wage in these auctions but are simply being asked to submit a bid without going below 
their reservation wage.  The bidding behavior of each participant can be drastically 
different.  Each participant may bid at their reservation wage which may not exactly be 
“truthful” but more of a strategy in order to increase their position for selection. 
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Figure 3.1: Bid Factor All 























1st High-All 1st Low-All 2nd High-All 2nd Low-All
 
 
Figure 3.2. Above illustrates the bid inflation relative to true reservation wages. 
 
         
20/80     66/34    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 1.444478498 1.264809283    Low 1.634328373 1.644515212   
  0.080305394 0.096247893      0.194548402 0.109368806   
High 1.396474868 1.37382961    High 1.376459436 0.993759892   
  0.125254441 0.178857512      0.277899047 0.107763949   
Contention      Contention     
         
34/66     80/20    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 1.402723438 1.458453515    Low 1.516084362 1.543630511   
  0.130680914 0.20769989      0.111934983 0.14615091   
High 1.153972663 1.102241162    High 1.441958113 1.186202601   
  0.124912706 0.152769878      0.161905549 0.198241403   
Contention      Contention     
         
50/50     90/10    
  1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format    1st 2nd 
Auction 
Format 
Low 1.498791486 1.707696523    Low 1.956715355 1.830009921   
  0.0973209 0.292597982      0.112617194 0.131647761   
High 1.360335464 1.305970752    High 1.809776602 1.313087522   
  0.089770733 0.154412536      0.184094799 0.215832082   
Contention      Contention     
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4. Overall Efficiency 
The dominant trend across all weights is that efficiency increases from high to 
low contention. Also all high contentions across all weights seem to have higher standard 
deviations than low contentions. High fitness, low bid weights with low contention 
appears to be the optimal choices for maximizing efficiency. 
In order to assess the impact on how small a weight can be placed on a bid before 
the efficiency of the auction begins to degrade we must optimize the auction data.  As 
indicated in figure 4.1 below, the results clearly indicate that when analyzing first price 
auction/low contention, the Navy’s MOE and Sailor bid are much more efficient. The 
problem with second price auction is that while more bids are generated per billet there is 
no guarantee that the Navy could actually repeat the simulated larger pool of participants 
per available billet. 
 
Figure 4.1.  Overall Efficiency 
         
20/80     66/34    
  1st 2nd Auction Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.986416389 0.983411961    Low 0.990423008 0.990501466   
  0.011958712 0.017871456      0.008245707 0.009367461   
High 0.683389996 0.692360281    High 0.770089012 0.875767261   
  0.056348801 0.059707655      0.093608355 0.071506187   
Contention        Contention     
         
34/66     80/20    
  1st 2nd Auction Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.987940808 0.710220971    Low 0.994126262 0.990720968   
  0.014317522 0.062241708      0.0054582 0.007885964   
High 0.802374063 0.786610927    High 0.77686694 0.839610234   
  0.050217665 0.066156076      0.055226009 0.054685731   
Contention        Contention     
         
50/50     90/10    
  1st 2nd Auction Format    1st 2nd Auction Format 
Low 0.987805379 0.982997801    Low 0.997687584 0.997316195   
  0.013633818 0.013284818      0.002566131 0.003115958   
High 0.769029666 0.767559708    High 0.688101018 0.846548521   
  0.081475254 0.053139311      0.043953693 0.075850121   




















1st High 1st Low 2nd High 2nd Low
 
Figure 4.2.  Above illustrates the extent to which a particular mechanism 
achieves the ‘ideal’ value of the objective function. 
J. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented the affects of bid weight versus high/low contention and 
1st/2nd price auctions in an attempt to find levels of optimization for each variable to 
improve the quality of auctions for the purposes of Assignment Incentive Pay. In virtually 
all aspects, 1st price auctions appear to be the most optimal, from the Navy’s perspective.  
  The results clearly indicate that the Navy should not pursue second price auction 
and engage in a first price/low contention auction approach.  Wage Bill is clearly 
optimized in a 1st price auction and although there are certain weights for which Fitness is 
optimized in 2nd price auction, by in large Fitness has no clear optimal auction choice 
over the other and therefore it can be assessed that a high fitness level will be maintained 
regardless of auction type selected. The “inefficiency” in bidding behavior displayed in 
Wage Bill contributes to low efficiency measures displayed in Bid Factor All for all high 
contentions. The Wage Bill results are interesting because they show that given rational 
parameters, some participants will still act irrationally. Furthermore, Overall Efficiency 
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displayed high efficiency for all low contentions which gives a strong indication that 
sufficient billets should be available to allow the auction mechanism many billet options 
when making assignments.  
Additionally, there are other considerations that must be taken into account. There 
are “a number of evaluation criteria used to analyze auctions and other economic 
mechanisms.”18  The auction process end result should come together in an equilibrium 
(i.e. a solution in which neither the bidder nor seller wishes to change its position).  
Auction design must also consider the speed of reaching this equilibrium and ensure 
auction stability. 
Auction stability ensures that no subset of agents could have done better by 
coming to an agreement outside of the auction.  Although all these criteria are important 
for the design of the auction process “the key criterion for the winner determination is, 
however, whether the solution to an allocation shows allocative efficiency.”19  
Specifically, the rearrangement of resources could make someone better off without 
making someone else worse off.  Furthermore, the Navy must determine its breakeven 
point at which the cost of auction assignment to voluntary assignment exceeds the 
benefits.  It must determine the maximum amount of monetary incentive in comparison to 
its utility (this should include all enlisted ratings). What’s more, the Navy must address 
the cost effectiveness of outsourcing shore duty billets which will vary by billet and 
location.  Finally, the Navy must determine its ultimate goal (i.e. fill rates comparable to 
all locations, best sailor for the command, lowest bid, application activity, maximum 
allowable incentive per billet or location, etc.).  Answers to these questions are beyond 
the scope of this project, and we believe that they warrant further study. 
 
 
                                                 
18 M. Bichler, The Future of eMarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001 (pg 73) 
19 M. Bichler, J. Kalagnanam, H. S. Lee and J. Lee, Winner Determination Algorithms for Electronic 
Auctions: A Framework Design. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center,  IBM Systems Journal 2002. 
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APPENDIX  A.. THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS TO 
MEASURE AND ASSESS THE EFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE 



























APPENDIX B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUCTION EXPERIMENTS 
Introduction 
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you will make decisions in 
an auction.  Several auctions will be conducted but the exact number is unknown.  You 
and 5 other participants (6 total) are gathered as candidates to fill 5 fictitious jobs.  
Whether or not you are selected for a particular job will in part depend on how qualified 
you are for the job (as expressed by a fitness score randomly generated by the software) 
and how willing you are to take the job (as expressed by how low your bid is for the job).  
The greater your bid for a job, the more money you will receive if you are selected for it.  
On other hand, bidding high for a job makes it less likely that the software will select you 
for that job.  Bidding high on all jobs makes it more likely that you will be unassigned.  
Being unassigned means that not only do you not earn any money in that auction but you 
will also incur a penalty of $0.30.  Exactly how your bids affect your assignment is 
explained below. Your task is to select a bid for a series of jobs.   
We will first conduct a short experiment that does not involve monetary payouts 
so that you may first familiarize yourself with the procedure.   
Your bids and profit in these auctions will be in terms of Gamebucks but you can 
convert them into U.S. Dollars at a rate of U.S. Dollars/Gamebuck = 0.10.  In other 
words, if you were to earn 10 Gamebucks in profit you would earn $1.00 in U.S. Dollars.  
Any profits earned will be yours to keep. 
For your participation today you are guaranteed to leave this room with no less 
than $13, but you may earn more. 
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How to Bid on Jobs in the Auction 
In the lower left hand box of Screen 1 you will see 5 jobs (i.e. Job 1, Job 2, Job 3, 
Job 4, and Job 5) on which you will bid.  For example, to bid on Job 1 click on the row 










             Screen 1 
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Screen 2 displays the same screen as in Screen 1 but now includes the bid 
calculator pop-up that will assist you in placing your bid for Job 1.  As you move the 
scroll bar to the right, the bottom three boxes will indicate that bid’s value in Gamebucks 
that that position of the scroll bar reflects, the corresponding Total Score (out of 100 
possible points) that bid generates, and translate that bid in terms of U.S. Dollars that you 
would earn if you were to submit that bid and be assigned that job.  Once you are 
satisfied with a particular bid, click on the “Save Bid” button and the pop-up bid 
calculator will disappear and you may select another job on which to bid.  Once you have 
placed a bid on all the jobs and are satisfied with your bids, click on the “Submit All 
Bids” button displayed in Screen 1.  At this point you must wait until all bids from the 





How Your Bids Affect Your Assignment 
In each auction you will be presented with 5 jobs on which you may bid.  You 
will be competing with 5 other bidders (6 total) for these jobs.  Your Total Score affects 
your assignment.  The higher your Bid, the lower is your Total Score.  In each of the 
several auctions in which you participate, the weight on your Bid is 80% and the weight 
on your Fitness Score is 20%.   This means that you may receive as many as 80 points for 
your bid and 20 points for your Fitness Score.  The highest value that your Total Score 
could be is 100 points. If your Bid were 0 Gamebucks, then you will receive all 80 points 
for the bid component of your Total Score.  On the other hand, if your bid were 100 
Gamebucks, which is the maximum allowable number of Gamebucks, then you will 
receive 0 points toward your Total Score.  The remaining 20 possible points come from 
your Fitness Score.  You will be randomly assigned a number ranging from 0 to 20 for 
your Fitness Score for each job.  This means that 1/5 of your Total Score is unaffected by 
your bid.  For each auction the software will then make the assignments that generate the 
maximum possible sum of Total Scores across all assignments.  An illustrative example 
is given at the end. 
How Your Payments Are Calculated 
You will receive $15 U.S. Dollars of Game Money that you may think of as 
“working capital” that you can either add to or lose in the following manner.  Note that 
this $15 is already reflected in the “Cumulative payment to date (including Game 
Money)” figure tabulated at the end of each auction and displayed as in Screen 3.  In the 
example case given, if all the auctions were completed, then your total payment upon 
leaving the experiment would be the $16.00 (as indicated on Screen 3). 
In each auction the Game Money may be added to or lost in the following 
manner. Suppose that based on the above calculations you have been assigned to Job 2 as 
shown in Screen 3.  Furthermore, assume that your bid was 35 Gamebucks.  Since your 
“My Minimum Bid” was 25 Gamebucks, that means that your profit is 10 Gamebucks 
(i.e. 35-25 = 10).  You may exchange that profit in Gamebucks for U.S. Dollars at a rate 
of U.S. Dollar/Gambuck = 0.10.  Thus, your earning from that auction is $1.00 (i.e. 0.10 
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x 10 = 1.00) in U.S. Dollars.  As shown in Screen 3, after each auction the software will 
update your cumulative payment to date (including Game Money) in U.S. Dollars to 
reflect the outcome of the last auction.  On the other hand suppose that you were not 
assigned any job.  In this case $0.30 will be subtracted from your cumulative payment to 
date figure as tabulated in Screen 3. 
Bidding less than your “My Minimum Bid” is highly discouraged in this auction.  
If you bid below your “My Minimum Bid” this increases the likelihood that you will be 
assigned that job and if you were assigned that job you will lose money.  For instance, if 
your bid were 20 Gamebucks and “My Minimum Bid” were 40 Gamebucks then you lose 
20 Gamebucks or $2.00 U.S. Dollars (i.e. 20x0.10 = 2.00).  In this case $2.00 (U.S. 




Information Provided to Inform Your Bids 
Screen 3 
CUMULATIVE PAYMENT TO DATE (INCLUDING GAME 
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On the right hand side of both Screens 1 and 2 for each of the 5 jobs you will see 
a table titled “All Possible Minimum Bids.”  This table indicates that for the 5 jobs in this 
auction there are 10 rows from which one row is randomly selected (with replacement) 
for each bidder.  The row highlighted is the one randomly selected for you for this 
auction.  In subsequent auctions another random selection will be made for you.  
Although you do not know the row that is selected for your competitors, you do know all 
the possible rows from which they are randomly drawn.  Furthermore, for each job you 
know whether or not your “My Minimum Bid” is above or below the average of all 
possible values.  For instance, you know that for Job 1, your “My Minimum Bid” is 25, 
which is slightly greater than the average of 24. 
Similarly, on the right hand side of both Screens 1 and 2 for each of the 5 jobs 
you will see a table titled  “All Possible Fitness Scores (max 20).”  Recall that the Fitness 
Score contributes to your Total Score as well.  Your randomly selected (with 
replacement) row is highlighted in yellow.  Other bidders will also be given a randomly 
selected a row for their Fitness Scores.  The other bidders’ rows may be different than 
yours.  Again, the averages for each job are presented at the bottom so that you have 
some idea whether your Fitness Score is likely to be better or worse than the average. 
You may want to refer to this information when determining how to set your bids 
for each of the available jobs.  From this information you may be able to draw some 
inferences about what your competitors’ bids are likely to be.  Since other participants’ 
bids affect your assignment, this information may be helpful, but you are not required to 
refer to it when determining your bids. 
How Assignments are Determined – A Simple Example 
To illustrate how the software will select who is assigned to a particular job, and 
Table 1
Job 1 Job 2
Bidder 1's Total Score 60 62
Bidder 2's Total Score 50 50
Bidder 3's Total Score 30 55
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who is not assigned at all, let’s take a simple 2-job, 3-bidder scenario.  The below 
Table 1 indicates the 2 Total Scores for each of the 3 bidders.  Given that there are 3 
bidders and 2 jobs, there are 6 possible ways to determine the Assignment Set.  The 
software calculates the Sum of the Total Scores for all 6 possible sets of assignments and 
then picks the one with the largest Sum of the Total Scores.  No bidder will be assigned 
to more than one job per auction.  In case of a tie the Assignment Set is randomly 
selected from those that offer the largest Sum of the Total Scores. 
Table 2 displays the Sum of the Total Scores for all Assignment Sets and 
highlights Assignment Set 2 as that is the one that generates the largest Sum of the Total 
Scores (60 + 55 = 115).  Accordingly, Bidder 1 is assigned to Job 1, Bidder 2 is 
unassigned, and Bidder 3 is assigned to Job 2. 
Payout in the Event of a Major Software Malfunction 
This software has been tested extensively but in the event of a software 
malfunction that precludes the determination of the your proper payout, then you will be 
given $30 for your participation.  The determination of whether there has been a major 
software malfunction will be made by the experiment administrators. 
Table 2
Assignment Job 1 Job 2
Set Total Score Total Score
1 Bidder 1 60 Bidder 2 50 60+50 = 110
2 Bidder 1 60 Bidder 3 55 60+55 = 115
3 Bidder 2 50 Bidder 1 62 50+62 = 112
4 Bidder 2 50 Bidder 3 55 50+55 = 105
5 Bidder 3 30 Bidder 1 62 30+62 = 92
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APPENDIX  C. JASS DISPLAYS OF AIP
 
Select this button 
for entry into 
JASS
JASS Displays of AIP
Initial view of “Review
Jobs and Make 
Application ” page
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The search resulted in









Limiting the search to 
only AIP jobs yields 9 
jobs
Select this 
job for more 
details
 
The NCTAMS EC Naples 
job has a “Max Bid” of 
$400.  This screen also 





This will take the 




page allows the 
Sailor to enter 





The drop down box 
is in $50 increments 
up to the max bid 
for the specific job
 
The Sailor make a 




Sailor’s bid is now 
registered in JASS. 
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